Nothing 'serious' or 'towards' anything today, just a fun, quick, easy-as-pie fisking (a practically word-by-word evisceration) of a random sentence on the Internet.
Over the centuries, Fundamental Moral Theology™ became so elegantly-formulated, and was taught so well -- so beautifully -- that any man today who had learned it diligently can still, in but a few words, if utterly unconsciously, lay out its tottering weaknesses with impeccable, crystalline clarity.
For in his salad days that fledgling student was elegantly taught to find with ever greater facility the well-worn ruts in the road within which his cart may safely travel, he had been so well and so clearly instructed, that it now seems obvious to him also, that nothing but trouble and difficulty could be outside these long-trod paths within which his cart travels so smoothly and certainly.
And so now, when asked or prompted, he with perfect surety is able in just a few words, to construct, to lay out, the correct, the obvious, path to fellow travelers.
This recently from a former monk, expostulating upon what he termed "fundamental moral theology" (he neglected to include the trademark, like KLEENEX™, so shame on him), and over whom we cast a veil of protective anonymity:
"1. Man always chooses to act in apprehension of the good, never choosing evil qua evil for its own sake."
... etc., through points 2-6.
"1. Man always chooses to act in apprehension of the good, never choosing evil qua evil for its own sake."
***
"Man ..."
Do we mean, "Man" qua Fallen? "Man" according to Kant? to Hume? to the Comanche?
That we can demonstrate that the Aristotelian "Man" may be incoherent within the terms of Aristotelianism itself is as nothing, mere philosophy; what is relevant to Catholic moral theology is that the Aristotelian "Man" self-generates a conundrum that appears to be radically incompatible with the worship of the Church.
All Catholic moral theologies, of course very much including Fundamental Moral Theology™, simply as Catholic, accept the faith of the Church as their given, and aim to provide an account by which that faith is defended and understood more deeply and completely. Fr. Keefe put it well in the Epilogue to Volumes I and II of Covenantal Theology:
...Catholic theology seeks to understand in ecclesia ever more fully the mystery mediated there, a mystery which we cannot comprehend, but from which we may learn forever.
[ CT II, Epilogue, p. 652 ]
Here we focus on the Church's firm profession that each man possesses a unique individual imperishable soul of infinite worth, which is created at his conception and which survives the death of the body and is subject to concrete specific judgment; and we investigate how well the Aristotelian "Man" accounts for this truth of the Catholic faith.
Before beginning, we should remind ourselves that within Aristotelianism the word 'form' has a specific and highly technical meaning that is central to Aristotelianism's entire Act/Potency paradigm.
So, when Saint Thomas, citing Aristotle, writes that "the soul is the form of the body" [S.T. i, q 76, art. 1, ad 3], we must ask ourselves, what is a 'form', such that the soul just is the (Aristotelian) 'form' of the body?
Although the specific language of 'soul' is not universally deployed within Aristotelianism, it can accurately be said that 'soul', and the technical Aristotelian term, "Form" mean -- must mean -- the same thing.
The 'soul' of any concrete specific thing whatever can thus be said to be the Form (the Substance/Potency) of its body. (Practically speaking, a "Form" just is an Aristotelian Substance, an Aristotelian Potency, and the particular term that is used depends on the context).
Any specific particular 'something' has its being, its very existence as that 'something', by its participation in the Form or 'soul' (or Substance or Potency) of its species.
For example, all vases have the Form of the species "Vase." A particular, specific vase is an 'accident' (an actualization in duration, quantity, and extension) of the single unitary indivisible Substance/Potency/Form of the species, "Vase."
Thus it is accurate -- not typical, but accurate -- to say that the Form of the species "Vase" just is a particular, specific vase's 'soul', that which distinguishes it from a mere (we might even say 'un-Formed') lump of clay on the potter's wheel, and gives it its being in "Vase-ness."
A specific individual vase might actualize "Vase" very well or very poorly, but absent its participation in the Soul/Substance/Potency/Form of the species, "Vase," it could not be a vase. It might still have some being, still be something-or-other, but it could not be a vase.
Aristotle deploys this general paradigm in his discussions of the nature of... pretty much everything.
In other words, "the soul is the form of the body" is a simple tautology -- the Form of the body is the Form of the body. 'Soul' just is the Aristotelian "Form;" thus: "the soul (is another name for) the (Aristotelian) Form of the body."
Similarly, a particular, specific individual man has his being, his very existence, by his actualization in duration, quantity, and extension of the inviolable, unitary Soul/Form of the species "Man," which allows each man to participate in, have his being in, "Man-ness."
However, when a man dies, we say that his soul (that is, the 'form' of his body) has 'departed' or 'left' his body. But we mean far more than that his physical body no longer exists as an actualization of the Form/Substance/Potency of the species "Man."
Ordinarily, Forms, being entirely immaterial, do not 'leave' material bodies. No thing 'leaves' or 'departs' a vase, when it ceases to be a vase. The immortal, immaterial Soul/Substance/Potency/Form of the species "Vase" of course remains completely intact. Much to the contrary, material things (such as a particular, specific vase) are abjectly subject to the ravages and dissolutions of time, and come to be, and come not-to-be, every day.
Only in the case of Man does one customarily speak of the soul 'departing' or 'leaving' the body.
In the case of a man's death -- when his soul has left his body -- what remains physically is a (rotting) corpse; an actual physical thing, yes, but not a man. Call the physical remains a 'used-to-be-a-man', if you will. But just as a crumbled-to-dust vase, a 'used-to-be-a-vase', no longer has its being in, no longer participates in, "Vase-ness," the corpse no longer participates in "Man-ness."
But when a man dies, his soul both continues to exist independently of the corpse and to remain that specific man.
For the Thomist/Aristotelian "Man," the situation is thus: a particular, individual man's soul, the 'Form' of his now-dead body, continues to exist, in fact is imperishable, but his soul/Form yet retains the specificity, the individuality, that by definition applies not to an (unchanging, unitary) Form itself, but only to (perishable, particular) actualizations of a Form.
At first glance, then, the Aristotelian "Man" self-generates a perplexity that Fundamental Moral Theology™ has traditionally 'resolved' by means of expedient oscillation between the two horns of a self-generated dilemma.
Here is the first alternative.
(a) Within the Substance/Accident paradigm, the Soul/Form/Substance/Potency of the species "Man," as all true Substances/Forms/Potencies, is unique and inviolate in se et non in alio, "in itself and not in anything else."
But how then can each particular, specific actual individual created soul also be that?
It is not possible to subdivide or multiply the inviolable, unitary Form/Substance/Potency of the species "Man" into other 'souls' or forms that become the unique, precious, imperishable 'forms' or souls of the particular, specific individual bodies of men.
Thus, it resolves nothing to posit that the 'Intellect/Mind' of a man is immaterial and therefore imperishable -- and that this is therefore the 'soul' that survives the perishable body.
For at best, each man's unique individual imperishable created soul (for the sake of argument, his particular Intellect/Mind), in order to remain his Intellect/Mind, would have to be an 'accident' or instance of the single indivisible inviolable immortal Soul/Intellect/Mind that is the Substance/Species/Form of the species "Man."
But even if it were possible to subdivide or multiply substantial being within Aristotelianism, which it is not, this scenario is not at all the faith of the Church. Our souls are not little pieces which have (somehow) become (partially?) detached from the Soul/Intellect/Mind/Form/Substance/Potency, "Man."
This is only the beginning of the difficulties -- the contradictions -- self-generated within Catholic moral theology, once the statement that the soul is "the form of the body," is joined to the supposition that the Aristotelian "Form" of our variant (a) here, defines what 'form' means in that sentence.
Viz., the doctrine of the unique existence and infinite worth of each individual imperishable created soul (who is subject to concrete specific judgment) is silently draped over a philosophical characterization in which there is and can only be one single immortal unitary indivisible inviolate unchangeable Soul/Potency/Form/Substance of the species, "Man."
The very moment the worship and faith of the Catholic Church becomes the prior, Aristotelian alternative (a) becomes radically incoherent.
Only one other Aristotelian possibility remains. Thus within Fundamental Moral Theology™, when discussion focuses on an individual soul, et voilà!, a placidly unreflective oscillation to Aristotelian alternative (b) typically occurs.
(b) OR the Aristotelian "Man's" 'soul' is unique to each particular, specific man. This variant forms the implicit background for discussions of an individual soul within Fundamental Moral Theology™.
As we intimated previously, this alternative analysis of the nature of things is not at all commonplace within the Aristotelian paradigm, because "Substance," substantial being, refers to the species, not to any material individual 'accident' of that species.
The "Soul" or Form, "Vase," refers to the species "Vase." Thus, the "Soul" or Form, "Man," ought to refer to the species "Man." The very definition of Substance/Form/Potency/"Soul" appears to rule out assigning substantial being, Substance/Form/Potency/"Soul" to an 'accident' of a species -- to an individual man.
Variant (b) resolves this difficulty. A particular, specific individual man's soul, "the form of his body," is unique to him, and continues imperishably after his death.
But in effect, in Aristotelian terms, variant (b) makes each man the sole member of his own species. "Vase-ness," the Form/Substance/Potency/Soul of the species "Vase" -- but not the vase -- continues even after the 'death' of a particular vase.
Therefore, for "Man1" to possess a unique, imperishable individual soul that is substantial in se et non in alio, "in itself and not in anything else," we must make him the sole member of his own species, "Man1." The Form/Soul of the species "Man1" thus continues even after the death of his body.
But thus variant (b) not only very much multiplies species, calling for the creation of a separate unique species for every man who has ever lived or will ever live; it also introduces the (unasked and unanswered) problem of "intraspecific" communication, solidarity, union.
(As each man is now his own Substance/species, there exists no built-in commonality between the species "Man1" and the species "Man2," etc. A horse is not a vase is not a house; a "Man1" is not a "Man2" is not a "Man3"....)
Of course, whenever Fundamental Moral Theology™ wishes to discuss "Man1's" moral duties, an equally unreflective oscillation back to variant (a) occurs: "Man1" now magically returns to being a member of the species "Man;" hence "Man" -- very much including "Man1" -- has such-and-such an end, and has thus-and-so responsibilities, etc.
And, as Fr. Keefe notes in the passage cited just below, on top of all these insoluble difficulties, there remains within any Aristotelian paradigm the supreme difficulty of accounting for a responsibility other than that which might be imposed, "necessary;" that is, the difficulty of accounting for, of even imagining, any free responsibility, a responsibility not in thrall to the otherwise ineluctable pessimism of Necessity -- of fallen flesh -- a responsibility that would not be imposed and could thus be fully moral.
Thus it would seem to require unreflective and incoherent oscillation, or torturous logic ad extra, to make the firm doctrine of the unique created existence, infinite worth, and concrete personal free responsibility of each individual imperishable soul an implication of the Aristotelian Substance/Accident paradigm, whereas that paradigm could readily be taken to be antagonistic to the doctrine or to rule it out entirely.
Fr. Keefe said it both more precisely and more comprehensively. The notion of a 'material substance' is incoherent within the Aristotelian/Thomist paradigm "without remainder":
Reference has already been made to the problem of assigning substantiality, whether to the individual, as is usual, or to the species, as seems to be more in accord with the act-potency analysis and even with the definition of substantiality, a reality whose unity in being is in se et non in alio. Whichever course be taken, the classic notion of material substantiality must remain incoherent, as has been shown: there is in fact no provision in the classic analysis for a concrete specific form in which the individual member of the species might participate and thus find a base even for its immanent (necessary) intelligibility and its (necessary) intraspecific or immanent activity, while to attribute substantial being to the material individual is to leave the reality of intraspecific communication unaccountable. This systematic impasse eliminates the rational possibility within the classic Thomist metaphysics of any material substantiality, whether of the species as a concrete universal, or of the isolated material individual, and does so without remainder.
The conclusion is then forced: the notion of a material substance, insofar as concerns the classic Thomist format, is unintelligible, incapable of a coherent act-potency account.
[CT Vol II (Chap V), p.446]
CONCLUSION: if we were serving as advocatus diaboli in the case, the above discussion prompts the question: Why deploy such a plainly incomplete or even actively antagonistic philosophy of "Man" within Catholic theology in the first place?
***
"1. Man always chooses to act in apprehension of the good, never choosing evil qua evil for its own sake."
"Man always"
"always" -- says who?
***
"1. Man always chooses to act in apprehension of the good, never choosing evil qua evil for its own sake."
"Man always chooses to act in apprehension of the good"
We respond in four parts.
(1) It goes without saying that "the good" is, of course, as that is defined within Thomism/Aristotelianism.
(2) THE Good in Thomism is the Deus Unus, the Aristotelian Prime Mover. The certainty of the "analogy of being," the existence of a 'natural' continuum between the Absolute and the Relative, thus becomes essential to Fundamental Moral Theology™. For unless the analogy of being holds, Fundamental Moral Theology™ is unable to be a moral theology at all.
Unfortunately, the analogy of being was known as early as the end of the 13th century to
...set up a radically contradictory postulate of a transcendent creator who is "naturally" known to be the metaphysical absolute, for it is immediately evident that of the transcendent absolute precisely nothing is or can be known, as a matter of definition: of the ineffable, nothing is said.
[CT Vol.I, Ch. II n. 37, p. 278]
The unfortunate reality is that, when this Thomistic set-up is read at the letter (as one would suppose Thomist logicians would ever want to do, but in fact they never do, but let's pretend), it is impossible for mere "Man" (redolent with multiplicity and extension) to have any ability whatever to apprehend his ultimate good -- or even to know whether he is closer or farther away from an apprehension of his ultimate good -- because Man's ultimate good is the strictly and completely transcendent (therefore, wholly unknowable) Deus Unus vigorously argued for by St. Thomas; for instance, in the first 26 questions of Part I of his Summa.
Again, a firm doctrine, that God has made Himself knowable by Man, is simply draped over a system that would at first, second, and third glance appear to simply rule the doctrine out (or that system is 'saved' by extensive, torturous logic ad extra).
At times, by way of a covering explanation, a bit of poetry is introduced: God "is so much more greatly unknowable than Man can ever know Him" -- something like that. (The sentence as it stands is perfectly unexceptionable; the difficulty is that, since the analogy of being fails, you never told us how "Man" can know this inherently unknowable God at all).
(3) The Deus Unus makes Jesus impossible. (Yes of course, Fundamental Moral Theology™ accounts for our Lord; but it must do so in terms of a contradiction that its system self-generates: it must account for a Word somehow spoken by a transcendent absolute about Whom "precisely nothing is or can be known.")
(4) In Thomism, 'the good' means, 'the proper end and functioning of a member of a species." Thus "the good for Man" has its ground in the inadequate, incoherent, or even actively heretical Aristotelian anthropology previously discussed.
***
"Man always chooses to act in apprehension of the good, never choosing evil qua evil for its own sake."
"never choosing evil qua evil for its own sake."
Moral theology solves "the problem of evil" (it is impossible to 'want' evil qua evil; it is only possible to inaccurately apprehend good, or in weakness to prefer a lesser good over a greater) in a manner that appears to introduce a problem into dogmatic theology, because the solution seems to lead to the following...
If we 'really' apprehended Christ with His bride accurately, we could do no other than choose life with them, but our apprehension is obscured and our will is weakened by the Fall, so we sin, which further obscures our apprehension and further weakens our will, and we are thus subject to judgment and punishment even beyond that of Original Sin.
But this schema given within Fundamental Moral Theology™ can provide no satisfactory account of how the Fall could have occurred in the first place. For the pre-Fallen Adam and Eve and the pre-Fallen Lucifer would by definition always want the good for themselves, would both apprehend and will the good for themselves accurately, since neither their apprehension nor their will had been weakened by the Fall, and it is impossible for them to "choose evil qua evil for its own sake."
===
So many gigantic theological difficulties, in so few words.
===
One almost wants to say to our earnest ex-monk, in the Southern fashion, "Bless your heart." But since he concludes his impeccably clear and heart-wrenchingly dunderheaded six-point expostulation in just that way, we cannot resist:
Here endeth the lesson.
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